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Abstract 
Responding to a series of aggressive 
tax planning allegedly committed by 
multinational corporations running 
their businesses on digital platforms, 
states have drafted laws that would 
enable them to impose additional taxes 
on such corporations. In the EU, the 
proposal for a Council Directive on 
the Digital Services Tax (DST) 
projects for a 3% tax chargeable on the 
revenues generated by corporations 
surpassing a certain threshold of 
global and EU yearly revenues. The 
initial plan is to tax these corporations 
for their online placement of 
advertising, enabling of online 
marketplaces, and sales of collected 
user data. While the EU organs are 
still undergoing the due legislative 
processes on the proposal, two flaws of 
the DST may be argued, namely that 
it conflates features of direct taxes (i.e. 
income tax) with that of indirect taxes (i.e. value-added tax); and that it 
embeds covert discriminatory measures against certain multinational 
corporations. The maturation of the DST depends on the formulation of 
sound legal principles and ingenious concept, which would hallmark a 
DST regime from the corporate income tax one. 
Keywords: EU, Digital Services Tax (DST) 
 
1. Introduction  
 The Digital Services Tax (hereinafter, DST) is 
currently living its salad days. A draft of DST law 
submitted by the European Commission has 
demonstrated the lack of experiences and underlying 
principles of the DST. It is due to the fact that the DST will 
only be an interim regime before a Council Directive on 
rules relating to the corporate taxation of a significant 
digital presence1 is enacted and became effective. 
                                                             
1  The European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Directive laying 
down rules relating to the corporate taxation of a significant digital 
presence’, COM(2018) 147, 21 March 2018, Article 4(3). In   the proposal, 
a ‘significant digital presence’ is to be determined in accordance with a 
corporation’s total     revenues, total number of users, and total number 
of business contracts generated in an EU Member State. 
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Legislators are, therefore, not incentivised to 
put as many efforts as rather permanent 
legislation would demand. Also, this is 
because the draft of DST law is based on 
responsive tax policy. The policy underlying 
the proposal aims at surmounting the 
‘misalignment between the place where the 
profits are taxed and the place where value 
is created.’2 Thus, within the DST, it is the 
rules on value creation that dictate the 
allocation of profits among states. The 
current international tax rules are considered 
as failing to ‘(…) acknowledge the role of 
[digital platform] users in generating value 
for digital companies by providing data and 
content or as the building blocks of the 
networks that are central to many digital 
business models.’3 In other words, within the 
digital economy, value is created in the state 
in which the users of digital services reside.  
Commenting on the UK DST proposal, 
Professor Deveraux 4  criticised that user-
based value creation lacks clear rationales 
under the existing principles. He asserted 
that ‘value creation’ includes a vast array of 
variables, as such that a DST—or similar—
regime cannot be justified by the principles 
of fairness and economic efficiency. 
Arguably, the EU DST concept is also 
                                                             
2  The European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council 
Directive on the common system of a digital services 
tax on revenues resulting from the provision of certain 
digital services’, COM(2018) 148, 21  March 2018, 2. 
3  The European Commission, ‘Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament and the   
Council concerning Time to establish a modern, fair 
and efficient taxation standard for the digital economy’, 
COM(2018) 146, 21 March 2018, 4. 
4  Michael Deveraux, ‘The Digital Services “Sutton” 
Tax’,   
http://businesstaxation.sbsblogs.co.uk/2018/10/23/t
he-digital-services-sutton  
tax/?dm_i=17AR,5XL76,U06BYQ,N8496,1, [19 
December 2018]. 
unjustifiable by the aims to protect the 
integrity and ensure the proper functioning 
of the single market, as well as the need to 
ensure sustainability of the EU public 
finances, as set out in the Commission’s 
proposal. Thus, is the current EU proposal 
for a DST feasible? If not, what might 
improve its feasibility? 
2.  Methodology 
This article is based on the doctrinal 
research conducted by the author. Materials 
scrutinised in the study comprises of 
primary references, such as the European 
Commission’s proposals for Council 
Directives on DST, and secondary 
references. Discussions brought upon by 
Michael Devereux on the subject matter are 
amongst the most scrutinized secondary 
references in this article. 
3. Disproportionate measures within 
the EU DST proposal 
It is not contested that the 
transformation carried out by the digital 
economy on the method by which people 
interact, consume, and do businesses require 
for tax measures that would bring about fair 
taxation and economic efficiency. 
Paradoxically, the standards by which a DST 
will be imposed are resulted from a simple ‘ 
face-lifting’ of the established corporate 
income tax (CIT) system, with additional 
influences from the Value Added Tax (VAT) 
system. It is insufficient to cherry-pick CIT 
and VAT features that benefit the states’ 
revenues the most and develop a new type 
of tax that aims at equalising the amount 
which would otherwise be paid as CIT. 
Furthermore, it is not acceptable to enforce a 
tax regime whose subjective qualifications 
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can only be met by certain taxpayers. After 
all, ‘(…) devising rules specifically for the 
digital economy may well be inappropriate,’5 
although digitalisation has made it easier for 
multinational corporations to set up their 
entities and shift their profits to low-tax 
jurisdictions.6 It is arguably the case with the 
DST proposal, which has significantly 
contributed to the architectural flaws of the 
tax. These flaws are coherent to, again, the 
responsive and temporary nature of the DST, 
in lieu of a comprehensive and long-term 
solution. 
2.1. The conflation of concepts estab-
lished in direct and indirect taxes 
The first flaw of the DST concerns its 
embodiment of tax principles found in the 
CIT and VAT systems, whereas the CIT, 
VAT, and DST are syntheses of distinct 
international tax paradigms. The CIT is 
based on the principle of ‘origin’, by which 
business profits are generated in the state in 
which capital and labour are deployed as 
means of producing goods or services (i.e. 
the emphasis on the supply side of income 
production). 7  The nexus for taxation on 
business profits is thus allocated to that 
state, unless a permanent establishment 
exists in the state in which the goods or 
                                                             
5  Maarten de Wilde, ‘Tax jurisdiction in a 
digitalizing economy; why ‘online profits’ are so hard 
to pin down’, (2015) 43 Intertax 796, 801. 
6  Michael P. Devereux and John Vella, ‘Implications 
of digitalization for international corporate tax reform’, 
(2018) 46 Intertax 550, 551. 
7  Maarten de Wilde, supra 5, 797. See also: OECD, 
‘Addressing base erosion and profits shifting’, (OECD 
Publishing 2012), 35. The OECD upholds the ‘origin of 
wealth’ principle, by which taxation of business profits 
are determined by “(…) (i) the origin of the wealth (i.e. 
source) and (ii) where the wealth  was spent (i.e. 
residence).” The origin of wealth thus represents “(…) 
all the stages involved in the creation of wealth.” 
services are destined. One should reckon 
that the CIT was designed with sound tax 
principles and policy objectives, including to 
facilitate cross-border trades through 
avoidance of double taxation. 
Meanwhile, the DST is conceptually 
based on the principle of ‘destination, by 
which business profits may—depending on 
whether sales are actually made—be 
generated in the state in which the produced 
goods or services are distributed to the 
market (i.e., the emphasis on the demand 
side of income production). 8  In turn, the 
principle is paving the way for ‘value 
creation’, which was reiterated in the Base 
Erosion and Profits Shifting (BEPS) project as 
means to tackle ‘(…) the use of intangibles, 
risks, capital, and other high-risk 
transactions to shift profits.’9 Battling for its 
way to overtake the hegemony of permanent 
establishment in determining the nexus for 
source taxation on business profits, value 
creation might have found its armours in the 
DST. Unfortunately, the DST is a mere twist 
of the CIT and with prejudice to the nature 
of opportunities for double non-taxation. 
The destination principle has been the 
backbone of the VAT system. By design, the 
VAT burden is meant to be carried by the 
consumers, thus has its emphasis on the 
demand side of income production. Recent 
literature has, however, sought for 
discussions on the Destination-Based Cash 
Flow Tax (DBCFT), which is also an attempt 
for an adjusted adoption of the destination 
principle into the direct tax system. The 
DBCFT is claimed to have the ability to, inter 
                                                             
8  Maarten de Wilde, supra 5, 798. 
9  See: OECD, ‘Action plan on base erosion and 
profits shifting’, (OECD Publishing 2013), 14. 
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alia, remove the incentives for taxpayers to 
manipulate internal transfer prices and 
eliminate taxation on business profits in the 
residence states, both of which through the 
so-called ‘border adjustments’.10 
A slightly less adjusted incorporation 
of the destination principle is, however, 
found within the conceptualization of the 
DST. On the one hand, the DST has posited 
multinational corporations as carriers of its 
economic and administrative burdens—thus 
attributes the DST with character of a direct 
tax, like the CIT. On the other hand, the DST 
is calculated based on the value of turnovers 
(i.e. the gross revenues)—thus attributes the 
DST with the character of an indirect tax, 
like the VAT. Its emphasis on the taxable 
objects (i.e. the taxable revenues) is also 
unusual for taxation on persons like the DST. 
Indeed, in its proposal, the Commission 
formulates the tax base of DST as to include 
‘(…) total gross revenues, net of value-added 
tax and other similar taxes’11 derived from:12 
(a) the placing on a digital interface of ad-
vertising targeted at users of that inter-
face; 
(b) the making available to users of a multi-
sided digital interface which allows us-
ers to find other users and to interact 
with them, and which may also facilitate 
the provision of underlying supplies of 
goods or services directly between us-
ers; and 
                                                             
10  Alan Auerbach, ‘Understanding the destination-
based approach to business taxation’, 26 October 2017, 
https://voxeu.org/article/understanding-destination-based-
approach-business-taxation, on 21 December  2018. 
11  The European Commission, COM(2018) 148, supra 
2, proposed Article 3(2). 
12  The European Commission, COM(2018) 148, supra 
2, proposed Article 3(1). 
(c) the transmission of data collected about 
users and generated from users' activi-
ties on digital interfaces.’ 
As further explained in the next 
section, the above activities have been 
redefined as to restrict the type of 
activities—the revenues of which are—to be 
taxed with DST. At this point, it is necessary 
to identify that, based on the above 
formulation of activities, the Commission 
seeks to include a vast array of business 
models followed by operators within the 
digital economy. The Commission, however, 
neglects the cascade effect inherent to 
turnover-based taxes. The European 
Economic and Social Committee (EESC), 
while identifying this as a potential issue, 
submits:13 
‘The EESC is concerned that by taxing turnover, 
with the negative cascading effects explicitly 
recognised by the Commission, the development 
of digital services, and in particular start-ups, 
could be harmed. The cascading effect arises 
when the services are sold several times and 
taxed each time.’ 
Indeed, more issues concerning the 
cascade effect of indirect taxes arise in the 
business-to-business (B2B) model than in the 
business-to-consumer (B2C) model, which 
major digital economy operators embrace 
the most. At this point, a destination-based 
tax has gained support in that consumers are 
relatively immobile, and that such taxation 
might be the only viable option even in the 
long term. 14  The B2C model, however, 
                                                             
13  Opinion of the European Economic and Social 
Committee on ‘Proposal for a Council Directive laying 
down rules relating to the corporate taxation of a 
significant digital presence’, OJ C 367/73, [3.13]. 
14  Michael P. Devereux and John Vella, supra 6, 555-
556. Also, a destination-based taxation on profits 
strongly relates to the protection of intellectual 
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presents another challenge of imposing DST, 
namely the collection of taxes. Obliging 
private customers to withhold the DST 
during the delivery of goods or services by 
virtue of digital platforms would present 
technical challenges, which in turn hinder 
the pursuit of an efficient tax collection 
system. At this point, taxing corporate 
profits by way of imposing indirect taxes 
seems to be disproportionate to establish a 
fair tax system. 
More disproportionate is the 
imposition of DST on gross corporate 
income. In this regard, one should reckon 
that direct taxes, be it income tax or DST, 
embrace the equity principle, by which the 
amount of taxes payable should accord with 
the ability to pay of the payer. In the income 
tax, this translates to measures such as 
exempted income, income brackets, and for 
entrepreneurs, the calculation of tax base on 
a net basis. Practically, the income tax laws 
allow for taxation on gross income only for 
the so-called passive income, that is to say, 
income derived from the passive use of 
capital (i.e. portfolio investments), such as 
dividends, interests, and royalties. The costs 
incurred in acquiring these incomes are 
usually low or indeterminable that gross-
income taxation is justified. It is not the case 
with business profits, which calculation for 
income tax must account for all costs 
deductible by virtue of the income tax laws. 
It is doubtful that the temporary effect of 
DST and the need to establish a fair tax 
system are sufficient in justifying gross-
income taxation in DST. Unfortunately, the 
disproportionateness of the DST does not 
                                                                                             
property rights by the state in which the products are 
marketed. 
end at the conflation of tax concepts. 
2.1.  The liquefied concept of ‘value crea-
tion’ 
The above conceptual flaws have led to 
disproportionate tax measures. The rapid 
growth of the digital economy is considered 
paramount that a responsive standard like 
the DST is urgently necessary to be 
implemented. Recent exposures of alleged 
tax evasions by actors of the digital economy 
later furnish for the retributive elements of 
the DST. Amongst the most sceptically 
disproportionate measures within the DST 
are whether the notion of value creation 
aligns with a turnover-based tax the DST is 
and whether the proposed rules on taxable 
persons for DST purposes constitute 
discriminatory measures against digital 
economy operators established in individual 
states. 
As previously concluded, a turnover-
based tax is disproportionate to the goal of 
establishing a fair tax system within the EU. 
Presumably, such method has been chosen 
by the Commission within the efforts to 
align taxation of business profits with value 
creation. The Commission argued that 
values are created in the state where the 
users are located, for ‘Users are providing 
data, sharing knowledge and content, and 
enabling wide and diverse networks.’ 15  In 
other words, these users have created 
‘customer-based intangibles,’ which are 
essential in accruing business values of 
multinational corporations, even when not 
                                                             
15  The European Commission, COM(2018) 146, supra 
3, 1. 
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operating digitally. 16  The EESC, however, 
argues:17 
‘Taxing turnover instead of profit and levying 
taxes where sales take place instead of where 
value is created a fundamental change from the 
current principles of taxation. (…) a shift in 
taxation will benefit larger economies with many 
consumers at the expense of smaller exporting 
economies. The EESC underlines that any 
solution, whether short or long term, to the 
taxation of digital business models, must result 
in a fair and equal economic outcome for all 
economies in the EU.’ 
Effectively, the EESC reaffirms that a 
turnover-based tax is rather radical from the 
existing international tax law principles, and 
more significantly, that values are not 
created in the state in which the users are 
residing. While the latter conclusion raises 
the concern of the possible departure of 
taxable income from one Member State to 
another, it posits the caveat of a distorted EU 
single market which is less attractive than 
emerging markets that do not impose a DST. 
If this conclusion is unlikely to occur, the 
imposition of value-creation-based DST will 
at least distort the balanced allocation of 
taxing rights established by the current 
networks of Double Tax Conventions (DTC). 
Conclusively, the EU considers itself as 
home of the investors—and thus retains the 
unrestricted taxing right afforded by the 
provisions of DTC—in respect of inbound 
flows dividends and interests (and perhaps, 
royalties), while simultaneously affirms itself 
as home of the investments—and thus insists 
on acquiring primary taxing right, 
notwithstanding the provisions of DTC—in 
                                                             
16  Michael P. Devereux and John Vella, supra 6, 555-
556. 
17  Opinion of the European Economic and Social 
Committee, supra 13, [3.15]. 
respect of business profits arguably 
generated in its territories. This constitutes a 
new level of tax sovereignty. 
2.2. The covertly discriminatory policies 
and measures 
The objective of a fair tax system is also 
unlikely to be achieved if the very means 
used in completing that goal is 
discriminatory. In its earlier studies on the 
DST, the Commission stated:18 
Digital companies are growing far faster than the 
economy at large, and the most extensive digital 
companies have huge user and consumer bases 
within the EU. For example, 42% of Europeans 
are users of Facebook. (…) the lion's share of the 
traffic is captured by the (…) global websites. 
Perhaps, the naming as above is just 
illustrative. Even if it is typological, it is only 
mentioned in a policy paper, and thus 
hardly forms a discriminatory treatment. 
After all, the Commission had committed to 
abandon ‘protectionism, deregulation or a 
race to the bottom’ and shift its digital 
economy policies towards ‘smart 
regulation.’19 Tax policies in the EU should, 
therefore, represent a balanced response 
against the challenges brought upon by 
digitalisation and new business models.20 
The targeting of foreign digital 
operator establishments is, however, 
reflected in the recitals and provisions of the 
proposed directive. Recital 22 of the 
proposed directive confers that ‘only certain 
entities should qualify as taxable persons for 
DST, regardless of whether they are 
                                                             
18  The European Commission, COM(2018) 146, supra 
3, 2. 
19  The European Commission, COM(2018) 146, supra 
3, 3. 
20  The European Commission, COM(2018) 146, supra 
3, 3-4. 
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established in a Member State or a non-
Union jurisdiction.’ The latter part of the 
phrase ensures that no overt discrimination 
arises. Covert discrimination, however, 
occurs when the proposed directive sets for 
a global revenue threshold of EUR 
750,000,000 and EU revenue threshold of 
EUR 50,000 in a given fiscal year. 21  The 
revenue thresholds seem to operate similarly 
as thresholds establishing permanent 
establishments would work. A monetary 
threshold as such is, however, alien to the 
DTC. Temporary threshold (e.g. a certain 
number of months beyond which a 
construction project would constitute a 
permanent establishment) or qualitative 
thresholds (e.g. the dependency of an agent 
to a principal) are more common to be used 
as means to establish a permanent 
establishment. Again, a depart from 
established direct tax rules. 
Furthermore, had a provision as such 
been adopted by an EU Member State, it 
would have invited for state aid 
investigation, or brought before the Court of 
Justice of the EU (CJEU) for a preliminary 
ruling on its conformity with the 
fundamental freedoms. When applied as an 
EU law, it would at least be a ring-fencing of 
the smaller business entities operating on 
digital platforms and have their customers 
within the EU territory. It follows that the 
Commission’s commitment to avoid 
protectionism has not been reflected in the 
DST proposal. The only way to comprehend 
the revenue threshold is to consider the DST 
                                                             
21  The European Commission, COM(2018) 148, supra 
2, Recital [22] and proposed Article 4(1). 
as an indirect tax. The VAT Directive,22 for 
example, confers for monetary thresholds on 
the total value of supply of goods (e.g., EUR 
10,000 intra-EU acquisition threshold). Such 
measure is, again, incompatible for a tax 
whose policy is based on the failure of the 
states in which sales are made to tax profits 
of digital corporations, only due to the 
inability of these states to formulate 
‘physical presence’ required by the existing 
corporate tax system. 
3. Proportioning the EU DST proposal 
In their joint statement on the 
establishment of fair and effective taxation in 
the EU for multinational corporations 
running their businesses through digital 
platforms, the governments of Germany and 
France have requested the Commission and 
the Council to focus the DST proposal on 
revenues generated from advertisement 
activities. 23  This statement consequently 
narrows the issues discussed in the previous 
section, among other things that fewer 
entities will be treated discriminatorily 
under the DST regime. The explanation is 
also well-reasoned, for advertising income 
has become a dominant income source of 
digital corporations. 24  The business model 
has been that users consume the services 
provided by digital corporation, while 
                                                             
22  Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 
2006 on the common system of value added tax, OJ L 
347/1. 
23  NN, ‘Franco-German joint declaration on the 
taxation of digital companies and minimum taxation’, 
available at 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/37276/fr-
de-joint-declaration-on-the-taxation-of-  digital-
companies-final.pdf [31 December 2018]. 
24  Hans Jarle Kind and Marko Koethenburger, 
‘Taxation in digital media markets’, (2018) 20 Journal 
of Public Economy Theory 22, 23. 
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advertisers will place their ads and pay for 
the fees—which are linear to the number of 
users—charged by the digital corporation.25  
Thus, it is the very technical ability of a 
digital corporation to manage the intergroup 
networks (i.e., systems of users and 
advertisers) that are critical to its revenue.26 
While the ability is reflected in the number 
of users, it is also reflected in the number of 
infrastructural investments (e.g. the capacity 
of its servers) made by the corporation 
which may be located elsewhere than in the 
state in which a significant amount of its 
users reside. The prevailing view of the 
Commission seems to be, however, to deem 
revenues solely generated in the state of the 
users. In the long run, a one-sided view as 
such could harm commercial relationships 
between the EU and its partners, mainly 
when resulted in the former acquiring new 
right to tax profits of foreign corporations. 
The EESC notes:27 
It is imperative to develop new principles on how 
to attribute corporate profits to an EU country 
and impose them, in dialogue with trading 
partners, in order to avoid any escalation of trade 
and tax tensions between major economic players 
in the world. The EESC underlines the need for 
appropriate and consensus-based solutions. 
Fortunately, the EU Parliament has 
improved the texts of the proposal. In its 
proposed draft, the Parliament argues, inter 
alia, that ‘digitalisation has changed the role 
of users, allowing them to become 
increasingly involved in the value creation 
process’, with a purview of closing the gap 
                                                             
25  Hans Jarle Kind and Marko Koethenburger, supra 
24, 23. 
26  Hans Jarle Kind and Marko Koethenburger, supra 
24, 23. 
27  Opinion of the European Economic and Social 
Committee, supra 13, [3.7]. 
between the taxation of revenues generated 
from digital and non-digital platforms. 28 The 
Parliament also reduces the EU revenues 
threshold to EUR 40,000,000. 29  Within the 
next stages of the legislative process, the 
Commission and the Council should also 
align their work with the existing 
multilateral efforts in addressing tax issues 
within the digital economy. The EESC 
submits:30 
When assessing the effective level of taxation of 
the digital sector, the EESC underlines the need 
to take into account the changes in the tax codes 
going forward due to the ongoing 
implementation of BEPS rules, and, in 
particular, to consider the substantially increased 
level of taxation in the US of US digital firms 
operating in the EU, due to changes in the US 
Tax Code. 
The efforts to proportionate the DST 
proposal thus do not need to deviate from 
the current international frameworks, 
although ingenious solutions—and not just 
mere conflations of existing concepts—are 
necessary. Amongst the feasible solutions 
are to harness the current ideas of 
permanent establishment and royalties, as to 
include activities conducted in the digital 
economy. 
a. Harnessing the concept of permanent es-
tablishment 
As previously mentioned, the idea of a 
DST was based on the difficulties faced by 
                                                             
28  The European Parliament, ‘European Parliament 
legislative resolution of 13 December 2018 on the 
proposal for a Council directive on the common 
system of a digital services tax on revenues resulting   
from the provision of certain digital services’, 
Amendment 2-3. 
29  The European Parliament, supra 28, Amendment 
37. 
30  Opinion of the European Economic and Social 
Committee, supra 13, [3.14]. 
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the states in which users of digital platforms 
reside to tax on the profits deemed to be 
generated by digital corporations out of their 
users. It has been the central scrutiny within 
the proposed Council Directive on rules 
relating to the corporate taxation of a 
significant digital presence, which is parallel 
to the proposal for DST Directive. While the 
latter measure is interim, the recent directive 
is expected to be permanent. In that 
directive, the notion ‘significant digital 
presence’ is introduced as means to qualify 
digital platforms as permanent 
establishments, the existence of which will 
induce taxation of profits by the state in 
which the establishments are located. 
In determining the digital presence, 
the Commission has proposed for thresholds 
on total revenue, number of users and 
number of business contracts concluded by a 
digital corporation within an EU Member 
State. While these measures are novel to the 
traditional permanent establishments, they 
are necessary for rendering the international 
tax rules adaptive to the rapid changes 
towards business platforms. Perhaps, the 
revenue threshold, as previously argued, is 
incompatible with the direct-tax nature of 
the DST. Notwithstanding, the EESC 
supports for the measure, although it 
proposes for increase in the threshold. The 
setting of the threshold should ‘(…) resulted 
in an outcome that does not risk hampering 
digitalisation but instead enhanced the 
functioning of the single market.’31 
 
 
                                                             
31  Opinion of the European Economic and Social 
Committee, supra 13, [3.14]. 
b. Harnessing the concept of royalties 
While taxation of profits of digital 
corporations is likely to be resolved by the 
thought of permanent establishment, studies 
can also be devoted to tax such profits by 
way of harnessing the international tax 
concept of royalties. It is made possible by 
the argument that users database constitute 
intangibles necessary in capitalising 
revenues within the digital economy. The 
values of users database are known as 
‘installed customer base’, ‘customer 
relations’, or ‘goodwill’.32 
Practically, there are advantages in 
taxing the royalties derived from the users’ 
database. First, the efforts to link value 
creation with the location of users may 
finally found success: users database are 
intangibles that are developed over time, 
taking into account the costs of 
infrastructural investments incurred by 
digital corporations in maintaining the 
values of the database. Second, taxing the 
royalties arising from the deployment of 
users database would only call for expansion 
to the current definition of royalties 
contained in the DTC. Doing so would avoid 
the introduction of measures alien to the 
current international tax regime, thus 
requires less political support. Lastly, while 
deploying the number of users as threshold 
for the creation of permanent establishment 
could lead to a state having taxing right in 
one year and not having one in another, 
taxing the income arising from the use of 
users database ensures stable taxing right for 
a state. The increase or decrease in the 
number of users would only affect the 
                                                             
32  Michael P. Devereux and John Vella, supra 6, 555. 
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amount of taxes to be collected and not the 
taxing right. 
4. Conclusion 
Based on the above elaboration, and as 
the answer to the first question of this article, 
it can be concluded that the current EU DST 
proposal by the Commission is not feasible 
to be adopted. Conceptual flaws have led to 
the measures being disproportionate with 
the need to establish a fair tax system. For 
one reason, the proposed measures have 
instead blatantly adopted features of indirect 
taxes, taking into account the aim of the 
Commission to tax profits of digital 
corporations operating in the EU, a direct 
tax. The ambiguous genre of the charge is 
resulted from the introduction of a concept 
by which fees must be paid in the state or 
states in which values (i.e. a significant 
portion of the profits) are deemed to have 
been generated, or the so-called ‘value 
creation’ concept. Unfortunately, the 
Commission and the EESC have differences 
in comprehending the concept.  
For another reason, as a result of the 
above conflation, the proposed measures are 
at least covertly discriminatory against major 
digital corporations established outside the 
EU and have their customer bases within the 
EU. In doing so, the Commission has 
introduced revenue thresholds within which 
business entities are not subject to DST. 
Simultaneously, these thresholds might also 
be seen as the Commission’s efforts to ring-
fence the smaller enterprises established and 
operating within the EU. The discrimination 
may be unseen by those who view the DST 
as a substantial indirect tax, which the DST 
is not. Revenue thresholds are typical to 
indirect taxes, particularly in order to 
mitigate the complication resulted from their 
cascade effects. This complication is, 
however, atypical to direct taxes. Revenue 
thresholds introduced in these taxes are 
meant to implement the ability to pay 
principle, which is more relevant in 
individual income taxes than in CIT. 
Meanwhile, as the answer to the 
second question of this article, it can be 
concluded that efforts to balance the DST 
measures with their goal of establishing a 
fair tax system have evidently been done by 
the EU Parliament. Users of digital platforms 
are considered as an essential contributor to 
value creation, but not the only contributor; 
while revenue thresholds have been 
lowered. A proportionate DST would, 
however, call for further efforts. A direct tax 
on the corporate profits of digital 
corporations should accord with the 
established international tax laws, 
particularly the DTC. The fee should be 
imposed as income tax as governed by 
provisions of DTC. In turn, a harnessed 
concept of permanent establishment should 
be able to formulate a ‘physical presence’ or 
other qualitative thresholds for digital 
corporations. Alternatively, efforts may also 
be devoted as to harness the concept of 
royalties within DTC, for arguments have 
been raised as to consider users database as 
intangibles—thus generate royalties 
payments. As a closure, it has been said that 
the law always comes behind than the 
developments—and the legal problems 
arising from there—taken place in the 
society. However, the law should not be 
formulated as means to establish a leeway, 
but rather as a dignified and comprehensive 
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response to the legal issues confronted by 
the people. 
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